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Abstract
This chapter provides a roadmap to the burgeoning literature on
two-sided markets with a specic focus on BtoB marketplaces. On-
line intermediation involves two-sided network e¤ects between buyers
and sellers, and the implications for optimal BtoB platformstari¤s
are discussed. The chapter discusses rst the monopoly case, draw-
ing attention to the distinction between upfront registration fees and
transaction fees. Then the competitive case is discussed, with di¤er-
ent degrees of di¤erentiation, the distinction between single-homing
and multi-homing, and di¤erent business models. The last section is
devoted to non-price issues such as sellers rivalry, tying, the design of
the matching process, the ownership structure and sellersinvestment.
1 Introduction
The development of digital technologies has led to drastic changes in the in-
termediation process, which combined structural separation of the physical
and the informational dimensions of intermediation with major innovations
in the latter domains. As discussed by Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2000)
e-commerce may be the source of several types of e¢ ciency gains, includ-
ing automation, better supply-chain management or disintermediation. This
has led the way to the emergence of a new sector of activity on-line, where
"info-mediators", building on traditional Electronic Data Interchange, o¤er
a wide range of electronic services helping buyers and sellers to nd trading
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partners and conduct trade on-line.1 As of 2005, European e-Business Re-
port (e-Business W@tch), which follows 10 sectors in the European Union,
estimates that 19% of rms were using ICT solutions for e-procurement while
17% to support marketing or sales processes (in shares of employment). They
also recently pointed to a surge of e-business since 2005 after some period
of stabilization and cost-cutting, as well as to the key role of information
technologies for innovating products. In the US, the U.S Census Bureau2
estimates that e-commerce accounted in 2008 for 39% of manufacturers ship-
ments and 20.6% of merchant wholesalers sales, while e-commerce sales are
modest for retailers (3.6% of sales in 2008) although increasing. For man-
ufacturers, e-commerce is widespread among sectors, ranging from 20% to
54% of shipments, the most active sectors being Transportation equipment
and Beverage and tobacco products.3 A similar pattern arises for wholesalers
although there is more disparity across sectors (from 7% to 60%), the most
active sector being Drugs (60% of sales), followed by Motor vehicles and
automotive equipment (47%).
BtoB intermediation platforms o¤ers a wide and diverse range of services
to potential buyers and sellers. One category of services pertains to what can
be referred to as matching services. This amounts to help members of the
platform to identify opportunities to perform a protable transaction (to nd
a match). The second category concerns support functions that help traders
to improve on the e¢ ciency of trade. This may range from simple billing
and secured payment service up to integrated e-procurement solutions. In-
deed the exibility of electronic services has created numerous possibilities
for combining these services into e-business o¤ers. While some sites are spe-
cialized in guiding clients in nding the desired product with no intervention
on the transactions4, others o¤er a full supply chain management service.5
In what follows I will be concerned primarily with the rst dimension
of the activity, namely the matching service. Moreover I will examine this
activity from the particular angle of the two-sided market literature. The
concept of a two-sided market refers to a situation where one or several
competing platforms provide services that help potential trading partners to
1See the survey on electronic commerce in The Economist (February 2000).
22008 E-commerce Multi-sector "E-Stats" Report, available at
http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/.
3The value is concentrated among six sectors: Transportation Equipment, Petroleum
and Coal Products, Chemical Products, Food Products, Computer and Electronic Pro-
ducst and Machinery Producst.
4Nextag or Kaboodle are examples of search engine proposing a comparison of products
and prices over all funishers.
5Examples are Sciquest which provides procurement and supplier management pro-
cesses.for life sciences, or BravoSolution a general provider of supply management.
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interact. It focuses on the fact that these activities involve particular forms
of externalities between agents, namely two-sided network externalities. The
platform is used by two sides and the benets that a participant derives
depend directly on who participates on the other side of the market.6 Most
of the literature on two-sided markets has focused on the determination of an
optimal price-structure for the services of the platforms in models where the
mass of participants on the other side is a key driver of value for a participant,
as will be explained below.
BtoB platforms clearly have a two-sided dimension. The two sides are
buyers and sellers, and a key determinant of the value of the service is the
number of potential trading partners that an agent can reach. Admittedly
there are other dimensions that matter as well. For instance eBays innova-
tion in dealing with issues of reliability and credibility with an e¢ cient rating
system has been part of its success.7 Also potential traders may care about
the quality of the potential partners. The two-sided market perspective is
partial but one that has proved to be extremely useful in providing new
and original insights on the business strategies of platforms, and that leads
the way for further inclusion of more sophisticated aspects in a consistent
framework.
The objective of this chapter is to present the main insights of the literat-
ure in the context of electronic intermediation and to open avenues for further
developments. After an introduction to two-sided markets, I will discuss the
implications for optimal tari¤s in the case of a monopoly platform, including
the role of up-front payments and of contingent transaction fees. Then the
competitive case is discussed, with di¤erent degrees of di¤erentiation, the
distinction between single-homing and multi-homing, and di¤erent business
models. The third section is devoted to non-price issues such as tying, the
design of the matching process and the ownership structure. The last section
concludes.
2 An introduction to two-sided markets
Apart from BtoB, examples of two-sided markets include payment card sys-
tems (Rochet and Tirole (2001)), video games (Hagiu (2006)), music or video
platforms (Peitz and Waelbrock (2006)), media (Anderson and Coate (2005)
or Health care (Bardey and Rochet (2010)).8 Telecommunication networks
6General presentations are Rochet and Tirole (2005), Jullien (2006) and Rysman (2009)
7See the chapter "Reputation on the Internet" by L. Cabral in this handbook.
8For detailed discussions, see the chapters in this handbook "Digitalization of Retail
Payment" by W. Bolt and S. Chakravorti, "Home Videogame Platforms" by R. Lee,
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and Internet are also instances of two-sided markets that have been the object
of many studies and the source of many insights.9
The literature on two-sided markets is concerned with the consequences
for business strategies of the indirect network externalities that generate a
well known chicken&egg problem: an agent on one side of the market is
willing to participate to the platform activity only if he expects a su¢ cient
participation level on the other side. Platformsstrategies then aim at bring-
ing the two sides on board10 and account for the demand externalities in the
price structure. Along this line, Rochet and Tirole (2006) denes a platform
to be two-sided when the prot and e¢ ciency depends not only on the price
level but also on the price structure.11
The most inuential analysis of two-sided markets has been developed
by Jean Tirole and Jean-Charles Rochet (2003, 2006). Starting from the
analysis of payment card systems, they developed a general theory of platform
mediated transactions highlighting the two-sided nature of these markets.
Transactions take place on the platform when supply meets demand, so that
the total volume of transaction depends on the willingness to pay of the two
sides, the buyer side and the seller side. Let tb be the fee paid by a buyer
per transaction and ts be the fee paid by a seller per transaction. Then
the maximal number of transactions that buyers will be willing to conduct
is a function Db (tb) that decreases with fee tb: One may dene similarly
a transaction demand by sellers Ds (ts) : For a transaction to take place,
a match should be found between a buyer and a seller who are willing to
conduct the transaction. Thus the total number of transactions will increase
with both Db and Ds: In the Rochet and Tirole (2003) formulation, as in
most of the two-sided markets literature, the total volume of transaction is
(proportional to) the product of the demands Db (tb)Ds (ts) : This is the case
for instance when each agent has a utility per transaction that is random,
Di (ti) is the probability that a randomly selected agent is willing to trade
and all trade opportunities are exhausted. This is also the case under random
matching.
For every transaction the platform receives a total fee t = tb + ts and
"Software Platforms" by A. Hagiu and "Advertising on the Internet" by S. Anderson.
9See the survey by Armstrong (2002) and the chapter "Mobile Telephony" by S. Hoernig
and T. Valletti in this handbook.
10The alliance between Cornerbrand and Kazaa described by Peitz and Waelbroeck
(2006) is a good example of such a strategy, as each side benets from it.
11Since there has been notorious di¢ culty to provide a consensus on a formal general
denition of a two-sided market, I shall not try to do so here.
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supports a cost c: Therefore the revenue of the platform is given by:
(t  c)Db (tb)Ds (ts) :
Maximizing the platform prot then yields the optimality conditions
tb + ts   c =  Db (tb)
D0b (tb)
=  Ds (ts)
D0s (ts)
:
Under reasonable assumptions, this yields a unique solution. Thus op-
timality results from a balancing of the charges imposed on the two sides.
While the total margin depends on some measure of aggregate elasticity,
the contribution of each side to the prot depends negatively on its demand
elasticity.
For our purpose, we can reinterpret the formula as a standard monopoly
Lerner index formula with a correct interpretation of the opportunity cost
of increasing the fee on one side. For every agent on side i who is willing to
transact, the platform is gaining not only the fee ti but also the fee tj that
the other side pays. Thus every transaction of an agent on side i induces
an e¤ective cost c   tj along with the revenue ti. Thus we can rewrite the
formula as
ti   (c  tj) =  Di (ti)
D0i (ti)
:
With this formulation we see that the fee on side i is the monopoly price
for this side, but for an opportunity cost that accounts for the revenue gen-
erated on the other side by the participation of the agent. As we shall see
this generalizes to a more complex set-up.
The price theory of two-sided markets is thus one of balancing the contri-
butions to prot of the two sides. While the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model
has been very inuential in promoting the concept of two-sided market, its
applicability to the issue of BtoB intermediation is limited for two reasons.
The rst reason is that it assumes that all potential buyers and sellers are
participants to the platform and, in particular, that there is no xed cost to
participating. The second is that transactions conducted through BtoB plat-
forms involve a transfer between the transacting parties. Whenever buyers
and sellers bargain over the distribution of the surplus from transaction and
are fully aware of each other transaction fees tb and ts, they will undo the
price structure so that the nal distribution of the surplus depends only on
the total transaction fee t = tb+ ts:12 For instance, in the case of a monopoly
12The statement is valid for a large class of bargaining models, including models with
asymmetric information (see Rochet and Tirole (2006)).
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seller, the total price (price plus buyer fee) paid by the buyer depends only
on the total fee t and not on the fee structure since the seller will adjust its
price to any rebalancing of the fees between the two parties. According to
the denition of Rochet and Tirole (2006), the market would then not be a
two-sided market.
Armstrong (2006), as well as Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) developed
alternative approaches based on the idea of indirect network e¤ects and mem-
bership externalities.13 In these models, agents are considering the joint de-
cision (possibly sequential) of participating to the platform and transacting
with the members from the other side with whom they can interact on the
platform. The models focus on one dimension of heterogeneity on each side,
namely the costs of participating to the platform (time and e¤ort devoted
to the registration and the activity on the platform), and assume a uniform
(but endogenous) benets from transactions within each side. Some progress
toward more dimensions of heterogeneity are made by Rochet and Tirole
(2006) and more recently Weyl and White (2010).
3 A model for commercial intermediation
Let us consider a platform that intermediates transactions between buyers
and sellers, where the service consists in identifying the protable trade op-
portunities . To access the platform, the two types of agents are required to
register. Once this is done they can start to look for trading partners. Sup-
pose that prior to his participation in the identication process for protable
matches, an agent on one side considers all agents on the other side as equally
likely to be a trading partner. In other words a buyer has no ex-ante pref-
erence about the identity of the sellers who participate. Suppose also that
there is no rivalry between members of the same side. In particular sellers
goods are non-rival, sellers have no capacity constraints and buyers have no
nancial constraints. In this set-up the willingness to participate of a buyer
depends solely on the prices set by the platform and on the anticipated total
value of the transactions performed. Moreover if the matching technology is
neutral and the same for all, the total value of transactions is the product of
the number of sellers and the expected value per seller (where the latter is
itself the probability that the transaction occurs times the expected value of
a successful transaction).
In this context, we wish to discuss how the allocation resulting on the
platform is a¤ected by the level and the structure of the prices set by the
platform.
13See also Gaudeul and Jullien (2001) for a monopoly model along the same lines.
6
There is a variety of pricing instruments that an intermediary may rely
upon for generating revenues from the transactions occurring on its platform.
Describing this diversity of situations is beyond the scope of this chapter. For
the purpose of discussing the two-sided nature of the intermediation activity,
it is su¢ cient to distinguish between two types of prices. The rst category
includes fees that are insensitive to the volume of activity and are paid up-
front by any user who whishes to use the platform services. I will refer to
these as registration fees ( they are sometime referred to as membership fees
in the two-sided market literature). The registration fees will be denoted rb
and rs for the buyers and the sellers respectively. Usually participation to
the platform can be monitored so that registration fees can be imposed on
both sides but they may be too costly to implement, in particular in BtoC
or CtoC activities.
The second category of pricing instruments includes those that are vari-
able with the number and/or value of the transactions. Transaction fees
are commonly used in BtoB activities and can take complex forms. For ex-
ample, eBay.com charges sellers an insertion fee plus a nal value fee
paid only if the item is sold which depends on the closing value. Of course
this requires the ability to monitor transactions which may depend on the
nature of the transaction and the contractual agreements with the buyer or
the seller. For instance, if the match between a buyer and a seller triggers
multiple transactions, they may avoid paying fees to the platform by con-
ducting the transaction outside the platform. In this case implementing fees
proportional to the value of transaction requires a commitment by one party
to report the transactions, either contractual or through long-run relationship
and reputation e¤ects.
When feasible, the intermediary may thus charge fees tb and ts per trans-
action for respectively the buyer and the seller. As pointed above, with com-
mercial transactions, the buyer and the seller negotiate a transfer so that
we can assume that only the total fee t = tC + tP matters for determining
whether a transaction occurs and how the surplus is shared.
Notice that while registration fees and transaction fees are natural sources
of revenue for BtoB platforms, they also rely on alternative sources of revenue.
First advertising is a way to nance the activity without direct contribution
of the parties. In so far that advertising is a way to induce interactions
between potential buyers and advertisers, this can be can be analyzed with
the toolkit of two-sided markets.14 Advertising will not be considered here,
but it is worth pointing that electronic intermediation has also dramatically
14See Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006), Anderson and Coate (2004), Crampes et al
(2004) and the chapter "Advertising in the Internet" by S. Anderson in this handbook.
7
a¤ected advertising by allowing direct monitoring of the ads impact through
the click-through rate. Unlike banner advertising, it is di¢ cult to draw a clear
line between BtoB intermediation and click-through advertising. Indeed in
both cases the platform adapts its response to the customer requests and
behavioral pattern so as to propose some trade to him, and is rewarded in
proportion to its success in generating interactions.
Other revenues generating strategies subsume to bundling the service with
some information goods. This is not only the case for most search engines
that act as portals, but also for many support services that are o¤ered by
BtoB platforms, such as billing, accounting or any other information services
for BtoB. Bundling may be protable because it reduces transaction costs
or exploits some forms of economy of scope.15 Bundling may also be part
of an articulated two-sided market strategy, an aspect that we will briey
address. Notice that in some cases bundling can be embedded into prices
by dening prices net of the value of the good bundled.16 For instance if a
service increases the value of any transaction by a xed amount z at a cost
cz for the platform, we can redene the net transaction fee as ~t = t  z and
the net cost per transaction as ~c = c  z+ cz, then the prot per transaction
is ~t  ~c = t  c  cz:
3.1 Membership externalities
In the simplest version of the model, there is no transaction fee. For any pair
of buyer and seller, let us normalize the expected value of transactions for a
pair of buyer and seller to 1:We can then denote by b the expected share of
this surplus for a buyer and by s = 1 b the expected prot of a seller per
buyer registered. Notice that s and b dont depend on the mass of sellers
or buyers, which reects the assumptions made above and which was the
case in most of the two-sided market literature until recently (see however
the discussion of externalities within sides below). This is in particular the
assumption made by Armstrong (2006) and Gaudeul and Jullien (2001).
Let us denote by Nb and Ns the number of buyers and the number of
sellers on the platform. Then the expected utility from transactions that a
buyer anticipates can be written as bNs: As a result, the number of buyers
registering is a function of bNs   rb that we denote Db (rb   bNs) ; where
Db is non-increasing. Notice that this demand function is similar to the
demand where quality is endogenous and measured in monetary equivalent.
The term bNs can thus be interpreted as a measure of quality that depends
15A particular form of economy of scope for electronic goods is a reduction in demand
uncertainty (see Bakos and Brynjolfson (1999)).
16See the chapter "Bundling Information Goods" by J.P. Choi in this handbook.
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on the other sides participation level. Following this interpretation, the
participation of sellers can be viewed as an input in the production of the
service o¤ered to buyers. As noticed in Jullien (2000), from the platform
perspective agents have a dual nature: there are both clients buying the
service and suppliers o¤ering their contribution to the service delivered to
the other side. This intuition then makes clear that since the price charged
to one side will have to balance these two e¤ects, it will tend to be lower
than in one-sided markets. This is then no surprise that the price on one
side may even be negative.
Following a similar reasoning, the expected utility from transactions of
a seller is sNb leading to a level of registration Ds (rs   sNb) : With these
demand functions, we obtain what can be seen as a canonical model for
registration to the platform. The participation levels for registration fees
rb and rs solve the system of equations
Nb = Db (rb   bNs) ; (1)
Ns = Ds (rs   sNb) :
Under some reasonable assumptions the system of demand denes unique
quantities Nb (rb; rs) and Ns (rb; rs) given the registration fees. Notice that
the model involves a network externality between buyers: although buyers
are not directly a¤ected by other buyers, in equilibrium, each buyer creates
a positive externality on the others through its impact on the sellersparti-
cipation. This type of externalities is what is referred to in the concept of
indirect network e¤ects.
Remark 1 When the demand is not unique, the price structure may matter
for selecting a unique demand. Suppose for instance that Di (x) is zero for
x non-negative but positive for x negative. Then zero participation is an
equilibrium at all positive prices. However if one price is negative (say rb) and
the other positive, the demands must be positive since Db (rb) > 0:
The platform prot is then given by (for clarity we set the cost per trans-
action to zero from now on, c = 0)
(rb   cb)Nb (rb; rs) + (rs   cs)Ns (rb; rs) ;
where cb and cs are the registration costs on the buyer side and the seller
side respectively. Thus the two-sided platform prot and the monopoly prices
are similar to those of a multi-product seller, where the products are the
participations on each side. An intuitive derivation of these prices can be
obtained as follows.
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Consider the following thought experiment: the platform reduces margin-
ally the fee rb and raises the fee rs by an amount such that the participation
of sellers remains unchanged. This is the case when the change of the fee rs
is proportional to the change in buyers participation: drs=dNs = s: Then,
since the sellers participation remains una¤ected, the change in buyers par-
ticipation is dNb=drb = D0b (rb   bNs) : Following this logic, the e¤ect on
prot of this "neutralized" change in price is (rb   cb)D0b+Db+sNsD0b: At
optimal prices the change should have zero rst-order e¤ect implying that
the optimal fee rb solves (the symmetric formula holds for the sellers side):
rb   (cb   sNs) =  Db
D0b
: (2)
The interpretation is then that the registration fee is the monopoly price
for the participation demand but for an opportunity cost cb   sNs: The
opportunity cost is the cost cb net of the extra revenue that the platform
can derive on the other side from the participation of the agent, which cor-
responds here to an increase in the registration fee by s for each of the Ns
sellers.17
Monopoly prices exhibit several interesting properties. First the presence
of two-sided externalities (b positive) tends to generate a lower price than
without externality, very much like it is the case of direct network e¤ects.
The size of the e¤ect on buyersregistration fees depends, however, on the
level of participation on the other side.
The side that values the other sides participation the least should have
(everything being equal otherwise) lower prices than the other side. This is
because it is the most value enhancing for the platform which can leverage
participation on the other side. Of course, this e¤ect has to be combined
with standard cost and demand elasticity considerations.
A striking conclusion is that the optimal price can be negative on one
side, if the cost is low. In many cases negative prices are hard to implement
in which case the registration fee will be zero, possibly complemented with
gifts and freebies. The theory thus provides a rational set-up to analyze the
behavior of free services as the result of prot maximization. For this reason
it is a natural tool in the economics of Internet and media, where free services
are widespread.
17With a cost c per transaction, the opportunity costs is cb+ cNs sNs which may be
larger or smaller than cb:
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3.2 Transaction fees
The canonical model abstract from transaction fees and it is important to
understand the role that such fees can play. While registration fees are neut-
ral to transactions (apart for their e¤ect on participation to the platform),
transaction fees may have a direct e¤ect on transactions. This is always the
case if the benets from trade are variable across transactions. Indeed, under
e¢ cient bargaining, a transaction occurs only when its total value is larger
than the transaction fee.
To start with, suppose that transaction fees are non distortionary so that
the volume of transaction is not a¤ected. Assuming a constant sharing rule
of the transaction surplus between the seller and the buyer, transaction fee t
leads to expected benets b (1  t) for a buyer and s (1  t) for a seller. The
expected revenue from transactions of the platform is then tNsNb; propor-
tional to the number of transaction. In the case of distortionary transaction
fee, we can similarly write the respective expected benets per member of
the other side as bv (t) and sv (t) with v (0) = 1: Then v (t) is the net
surplus of a pair of buyer and seller from a transaction and the probability
that a pair of buyer and seller transact is v0 (t) :18
In the case of distortionary transactions fees, the total expected surplus
for a pair of buyer and seller is v (t) + v0 (t) t: A classical argument for two-
part tari¤s shows that when the platform can combine a transaction fee
with registration fees, then the optimal transaction fee maximizes this total
surplus (Rochet and Tirole (2006), Jullien (2007)). The general intuition
is that the platform can always rebalance the prices so as to increase the
surplus from transactions and maintain participation levels, implying that
the welfare gains generated are captured by the platform. To see that, notice
that demand functions are given by
Nb = Db (rb   bv (t)Ns) ; (3)
Ns = Ds (rs   sv (t)Nb) :
Using ri = D 1i (Ni)+jv (t)Nj, we can write the prot in terms of quantities
as  
D 1b (Nb)  cb

Nb +
 
D 1s (Ns)  cs

Ns

+ (v (t) + v0 (t) t)NbNs:
With this formulation we see that the prot can be decomposed into two
parts. The rst part is a standard prot function for selling quantity Nb on
18To see that let u be the value of a transaction and F (u) its cdf. Then (b + s) v (t) =R +1
t
(u  t) dF (u) which derivative is 1 F (u) the probability that the transaction occurs.
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the buyer side and Ns on the seller side : The second part is a term capturing
the strategic dimension of the externality. From the prot formulation it is
immediate that for any participation levels on each side, the platforms should
set the fee at a level that maximizes the total expected surplus v (t)+v0 (t) t.19
As mentioned above the conclusion that transaction fees should aim at
maximizing the surplus generated by the activity of agents on the platform
is reminiscent of similar results in two-part tari¤s. From this we know that it
has to be qualied when applied to a more general context. For one thing the
conclusion relies on the assumption that agents are risk neutral. If a parti-
cipant faces some uncertainty on future transactions, then transferring some
of the platform revenue from xed payment (registration fees) to transaction
fees is a way to provide some insurance. The risk on the nal utility of the
agent is reduced which may raise e¢ ciency when the agent is risk averse.20
Second, the conclusion relies on the assumption that the expected benets
from transactions are uniform across buyers or across sellers (see below).
Hagiu (2004) points to the fact that the level of transaction fees matters
also for the platform incentives to foster transactions. In his model there
is insu¢ cient trade so that total surplus is maximized by subsidizing trade.
Running a decit on transactions fosters more e¢ cient trades by members
of the platform, however it may hinder the platform incentives to attract
new participants in a dynamic setting. Indeed once a signicant level of
participation is reached, any new participant raises the volume of transactions
of already registered members and thus the decit that the platform incurs
on these transactions. Conversely positive transaction fees raise the gain of
attracting a new member. The ability of the platform to commit on its future
strategy then matters for the conclusion. A lack of commitment may lead
the platform to opt for positive transaction fees.
3.3 Welfare
Two-sided markets provide not only a framework to analyze platforms pri-
cing strategies but also a convenient and insightful framework for analyzing
welfare issues. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived in Jullien and Gaud-
eul (2001) and Armstrong (2006). These prices follow from standard argu-
ments in welfare economics applied to networks. To discuss this, consider the
19This conclusion extends to duopoly with single-homing.
20As an illustration, while in 2005, the leading automotive e-procurement portal, Covin-
sint, was relying on membership fees, its smaller competitor Partsforindustry was relying
most extensively on volume related payment (Jullien (2006)).
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case without transaction fees. Recall that the participation of an additional
buyer generates an average value s for every seller on the platform. Like
for any other externality (pollution or congestion, for instance), since the
buyer makes his decisions based on his own benets solely, his participation
decision is e¢ cient when he faces a price that internalizes all the costs and
benets for other agents in the society. In the case of a two-sided market
the net cost for society is the physical cost diminished by the value of the
externality created on the other side, cb   sNs: A similar argument on the
other side shows that the allocation is e¢ cient only when both sides face
(total) prices pb = cb   sNs and ps = cs   bNb:
Thus socially e¢ cient prices are below marginal cost, a conclusion that
is in line with the conclusions for direct network e¤ects. One may then in-
terpret these prices as "social opportunity costs". Notice that they coincide
with the platforms opportunity costs. This is due to the fact that the ex-
pected benets from transactions is uniform within each side. If it were not
the case, the two opportunity costs would di¤er by a factor reecting the
traditional Spence distortion: the platform would care about the externality
on the marginal member while social welfare would require to care about the
externality on the average member (see the discussion of Weyl (2010)).
This being understood, one can apply standard intuition to these oppor-
tunity costs. For instance, optimal tari¤s under budget balanced conditions
can be derived as Ramsey prices for the two segments that constitute the
two sides, whereby the mark-up over the opportunity cost is proportional to
the inverse elasticity of participation (Gaudeul and Jullien (2001)).
Similar conclusions can be derived when transaction fees can be used (see
Jullien (2007)). Clearly, social welfare is maximized when the transaction
fee maximizes the expected trade surplus. Therefore, subject to the caveats
discussed above, there is no divergence between privately optimal (monopoly)
and socially optimal transaction fees. Given the transaction fees, the analysis
of socially optimal registration fees is the same as above but accounting for
the fact that the externality induced by the participation of an agent on one
side includes not only the value created for members on the other side but
also the prot created for the platform.
3.4 Usage heterogeneity
There is little contribution on optimal tari¤s when both the benets from
transactions and the costs of participation are heterogenous.
A noticeable exception is Weyl (2010) which provides a remarkable ana-
lysis of tari¤s with heterogeneity in the transaction values s and b. Then
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participation demand on side i = s; b for the case with no transaction fees
takes a non-linear form Di (pi; Nj) that depends on the joint distribution
of the participation cost and the benet i: The intuition developed above
concerning the opportunity cost of adding one more member to the platform
extends. In particular, he characterizes the increase ~j of the revenue per
member of side j that a platform can obtain with one more member on side
i; keeping the participation Nj constant on side j: The opportunity cost of
selling to side i is then as above ci   ~jNj: Weyl then shows that monopoly
pricing follows standard Lerner index formulas for these opportunity costs:
ri   (ci   ~jNj) =  Di
D0i
;
where the elasticity term is with respect to the price.
He also extends the welfare analysis by showing that socially optimal
registration fees are equal to a social opportunity cost derived as follows.
For one more member on side i, let j be the mean increase of the utility of
members who are registered on the other side. Then the social opportunity
cost can be dened as ci   jNj:
Weyl identies two distortions associated with the exercise of market
power in two-sided markets. One is the standard monopoly mark-up over
marginal cost. The second is reected in the fact that ~j may di¤er from
j; which corresponds to the standard distortion in the provision of quality
by a monopoly. Indeed, as already pointed, participation on one side can be
viewed as a quality dimension on the other side. When deciding on the price
on one side, the monopolist accounts for the e¤ect on the marginal member
on the other side and ignores infra-marginal members. By contrast, a social
welfare perspective requires to account for the average member.
4 Competing platforms
Competition between platforms is shaped by the chicken&egg nature of the
activity, as the driver of success on one side is success on the other side.
As pointed in Jullien (2000), each user of a platform is both a consumer of
the service and an input for the service o¤ered to the other side. Platforms
pricing strategies then reect the competition to sell the service, but also the
competition to buy the input. As we shall see, this dual nature of competition
may generate complex strategies using cross-subsidies and a departure of
prices from marginal costs.
Key determinants of the competitive process discussed below are whether
platforms obtain exclusivity from their clients or not, how di¤erentiated they
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are and what tari¤s they can use. The situation where agents can register with
several platforms is usually referred to as multi-homing. In discussing the
competitive outcome, I devote the rst part to the case of exclusive dealing
by buyers and sellers (single-homing), and then I discuss multi-homing.
4.1 Overcoming the multiplicity issue
One issue that is faced when dealing with platform competition, that is akin
to competition with network e¤ects, is the issue of multiplicity. There may
be di¤erent allocations of buyers and sellers compatible with given prices,
which complicates the equilibrium analysis. There are at least three ways
to address this issue. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) develop a methodology to
characterize the full set of equilibria, based on imposing specic conditions
on the demand faced by a platform deviating from the equilibrium (using
the notion of pessimistic beliefs discussed below). Another approach consists
in focusing on situations where multiplicity is not an issue. Along this line,
Armstrong (2006) assumes enough di¤erentiation between the platforms for
the demand to be well dened. Armstrongs model has proven to be very
exible and is widely used by researchers on two-sided markets.21 Ongoing
work by Weyl and White (2010) relies on a particular type of non-linear
tari¤s introduced in Weyl (2010), named "insulating tari¤s". These tari¤s
are contingent on participation levels of the two sides and designed in such
a way that participation on one side becomes insensitive to the other sides
participation, thereby endogenously removing the source of multiplicity.
The last approach is to choose among the possible demands one particular
selection. For instance, Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) imposes a game the-
ory selection criterion (coalitional rationalizability) that can be interpreted
as some limited level of coordination between sides. Jullien (2000) and Hagiu
(2006) introduce the concept of pessimistic beliefs that assumes that agents
always coordinate on the least favorable demand for one pre-determined plat-
form. Jullien (2000) notices that, since which demand emerges depends on
agents expectations, one platform will be at a disadvantage if agents view
the competing platform as focal. The concept of pessimistic beliefs captures
this idea in a formal way and allows to study the e¤ect on competition and
entry of the advantage derived from favorable expectations.
Beyond the technical di¢ culty, this multiplicity issue reminds of the im-
portance of agents expectation in the outcome of competition between plat-
forms. There has been little work on the role of reputation in the dynamics
of BtoB marketplaces, an issue that should deserve more attention (Jullien
21The Rochet and Tirole (2003) model has also a unique equilibrium in duopoly.
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(2000) and Caillaud and Jullien (2003) can be interpreted as addressing these
issues).
4.2 Competition with exclusive participation
The main contributions on competition between platforms are Armstrong
(2006) and Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003).22 Exclusivity refers to the fact
that agents can be active only on one platform. Whether this applies to BtoB
platforms depends on the concrete context. For example an industrial buyer
that relies on the platform for its supply-chain management would typically
have an exclusive relationship with the platform, while his suppliers may not.
More generally e-procurement may require the buyer to deal exclusively with
the platform.
One lesson from the literature is that the nature of competition may be
drastically a¤ected by factors such as complementary services o¤ered by the
platform and whether the platforms are perceived to be di¤erentiated or
not. To illustrate this we can contrast several contributions in the context of
competition with registration fees only.
Armstrong (2006) assumes that the platforms provide enough services for
the demand to be always positive (Di (0) is positive in our model) and that
these services are di¤erentiated across platform. More precisely, Armstrongs
model extends the framework of section 2 by assuming that two symmetric
platforms are di¤erentiated à la Hotelling on each side, with large enough
transportation costs and full coverage of the market. With di¤erentiated
platforms, the residual demand of one platform is well dened and the in-
tuition on opportunity costs applies. Suppose that each platform covers half
of the market on each side, and one platform decides to attract one more
buyer away from its competing platform. This raises its value for sellers by
s but at the same time this reduces the value of the competing platform for
sellers by s since the buyer is moving away from the competitor. Therefore
the platform can raise its registration fee rS by 2s with unchanged sellers
demand. Given that it serves half of the market, the platform increase its
prot on the seller side by 2s  1=2 when it attracts one more buyer. The
opportunity cost of attracting a buyer is then cb   s, and by the same
reasoning it is cs   b for a seller. Armstrong shows that the equilibrium
registration fees are the Hotelling equilibrium prices for these opportunity
costs: ri = ci   j + i; where i is the equilibrium Hotelling mark-up
22The literature on competition between mobile telecommunication networks has intro-
duced many of the relevant concepts (see Armstrong (2002) for a review). See also the
chapter "Mobile Telecommunications" by S. Hoernig and T. Valletti in this handbook.
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(the transportation cost). The conclusion is thus that prices are reduced on
both sides when the markets are two-sided compared to the one-sided case
(s = b = 0) and that the strongest e¤ect is on the market that induces
relatively more externality for the other side, a conclusion in line with the
lessons from the monopoly case.
Caillaud and Jullien (2001), by contrast, analyze the case of non-di¤erentiated
platforms that provide pure intermediation service to homogenous buyers and
sellers. Suppose there is a mass 1 on each side and that when Nkj members of
side j register with platform k = A;B; a member of side i obtains a utility
jN
k
j with no other value attached to the platforms services. In this context,
demands are not well dened. If the absolute value of the price di¤erential
on each side is smaller than the average value i of transactions, then there
are two possible equilibria: one where all buyers and sellers join platform A
and one where they all join platform B: To x ideas, assume that platform B
faces "pessimistic beliefs" which here imposes that in the above situation all
agents register with platform A: Then the most e¢ cient competitive strategy
for platform B takes the form of a divide&conquerstrategy. When plat-
form A o¤ers prices ri  i, a strategy for platform B consists in setting
fees rs   s   " < 0 for sellers (divide) and b + inff0; rbg for buyers (con-
quer). The platform subsidizes the sellers at a level that compensates them
for being alone on the platform, thereby securing their participation. This
creates a bandwagon e¤ect on the other side of the market. Hence buyers
are willing to pay b to join the platform if rb > 0 (since platform A has no
value without sellers) or b   rb if rb < 0: A divide&conquer strategy then
subsidizes participation on one side and recoups the subsidy by charging a
positive margin on the other side. The mirror strategy subsidizing buyers
can be considered. Caillaud and Jullien (2001) then show that platform A
serves the whole market and obtains a positive prot equal to the di¤erence
between the values of transactions js   bj ; and Caillaud and Jullien (2003)
show that more generally when no restriction is imposed on the demand sys-
tem (except some monotonicity condition), the set of equilibria consists in
one platform serving the whole market and making a prot between 0 and
js   bj :
Armstrong (2006) and Caillaud and Jullien (2003) thus lead to very dif-
ferent conclusions and equilibrium strategies, where the di¤erence lies mostly
in the intensity of the impact of indirect network e¤ects on demand. In Arm-
strongs model, the demand is smooth and externalities raise the elasticity
of the residual demand, as in Rochet and Tirole (2003) canonical model. In
Caillaud and Jullien (2001,2003) externalities generate strong band-wagon
e¤ects and non-convexities.
The model of Caillaud and Jullien has also the particularity that all the
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value is derived from pure intermediation. Surprisingly it is this feature that
allows the active platform to generate positive prot. Jullien (2000) considers
the same model but assumes that there is an intrinsic value to participating
on a platform even if no member of the other side is present. If this "stand-
alone" value is large enough, then the analysis of divide&conquer strategy is
the same except that the "conquer" price is b+ rb instead of b+ inff0; rbg
(the reason is that buyers would pay rb > 0 even if there is no seller on the
platform). This simple twist has a drastic implication since it implies that
with homogenous competing platforms, there doesnt exist a pure strategy
equilibrium. The reason is that for any prot rb + rs that a platform can
obtain in equilibrium, its competitor can obtain rs + rb + js   bj with an
adequate divide&conquer strategies.
What to retain from this? First, as it is often the case with network
e¤ects, the existence of indirect network e¤ects in the BtoB marketplaces
tends to intensify competition, at least when intermediation is only one part
of the activity of platforms. A di¤erence with the monopoly case is that
the opportunity cost of attracting a member on the platform has another
component than the value created on the other side: it is the "competitive
hedge" due to the fact that attracting a member from the other platform
deprives the latter from the very same value. Thus in a competitive context
the e¤ect of network externalities is doubled, which is what explains the
inexistence result of Jullien (2000).
Second, where the business models are fundamentally based on pure inter-
mediation activities, it may be very di¢ cult to compete with well established
platforms that benet from reputation e¤ects. This conclusion for instance
shades some light on the high degree of concentration that characterizes the
market for search engines (however this should be pondered by multi-homing
considerations discussed below).23 New entrants may then rely on alternat-
ive strategies involving horizontal di¤erentiation and multi-homing by some
agents, as discussed below.
Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) also illustrate the fact that the pattern
of prices in two-sided markets may exhibit implicit cross-subsidies. As a
result, even two sides that have similar characteristics may face very di¤erent
prices, a feature that is referred to as price skewness by Rochet and Tirole
(2003).24 Unlike the case of a one-sided market where competition tends to
align prices with marginal costs, competition between two-sided platforms
23See the chapter "Product and Price Comparison Sites" by J. Moraga and M. Wilden-
beest in this handbook.
24This conclusion is corrobated by Jullien (2000)s treatment of a general competitive
game between multi-sided platforms.
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tends to exacerbate the skewness of prices and leads to permanent departure
of prices from marginal costs (or even from opportunity costs as dened
before). The reason is that it raises the incentives to gain a competitive
advantage by courting some side.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is much to learn for the case
where the value of transactions is heterogenous within each side.25 Ambrus
and Argenziano (2009) provides the insight that when agents di¤er in their
usage value, then size on one side may act as a screening device on the other
side. This opens the possibility of endogenous di¤erentiation whereby mul-
tiple platforms with very di¤erent participation patterns coexist, the equi-
librium allocation being supported by endogenous screening.
4.3 Multi-homing
The previous discussion assumes that agents register only to one platform
which appears unrealistic for many BtoB platforms. For instance, in e-
tendering, typically buyers single-home but sellers may be active on several
platforms simultaneously. More generally, platforms o¤ering supply-chain
management may have only one side single-homing depending on which end
of the supply-chain is targeted by the platforms process.
When one side can register to both platforms and not the other one, then
a particular form of competition emerges that is referred to as competit-
ive bottleneckby Armstrong (2006), where the term is borrowed from the
debate over termination charges in mobile telecommunications. Indeed plat-
forms do not really compete to attract multi-homing agents as the "products"
o¤ered to them are non-rival. To see that suppose sellers are multi-homing
and not buyers. Then a platform can be viewed as providing an exclusive
access to its registered buyers: from the perspective of sellers it is a bottle-
neck. Thus it can charge sellers the full value of accessing its population of
registered buyers. There is no rivalry on the sellers side as access to one
platform is not substitutable with access to another platform.26 The prot
on the seller side is however competed away on single-homers. Indeed fol-
lowing the logic developed in the previous sections, the opportunity cost of
attracting a buyer discounts the prot that the buyer allows to generate on
the seller side. The equilibrium prices on the buyer side will thus be lowered
to an extent that depends on the rate at which costs are passed on to buyers
in equilibrium. This e¤ect, according to which higher revenue per user on
one side translates into lower prices on the other side, is what is referred to
25See the on-going work by Weyl and White (2010).
26This assumes away any resource constraint or other diminishing returns for sellers.
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as the waterbed e¤ect in the telecommunication literature and sometime as
the seesaw e¤ect in the literature on two-sided markets.27
Notice that in comparison to single-homing, multi-homing leads to higher
prices for the multi-homing side, there is no clear comparison on the single-
homing side. The reason is that while the revenue that is generated by an
additional single-homing agent is higher, the additional "competitive hedge"
e¤ect discussed in the previous section disappears with vanishing competition
on the multi-homing side. Both Armstrong (2006) and Caillaud and Jullien
(2003) however concludes that prots are higher when there is multi-homing
on one side. Armstrong and Wright (2007) shows that a competitive bottle-
neck may emerge endogenously when di¤erentiation is low on one side, but
its sustainability is undermined by the possibility to o¤er exclusive contracts
to multi-homers.
4.4 Transaction fees
The results discussed so far concern competition with registration fees, which
apply to some marketplaces but not all. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) analyze
the outcome of Bertrand type competition with transaction fees in a context
where transaction fees are non-distortionary. Much remains to be done for
situation where transaction fees have distortionary e¤ects.
One main insight follows from the remark that transaction fees act as
a form of risk sharing between the platform and the agents, because the
payment is made only in case of a transaction while the platform would
support the full cost in case no transaction occurs. Therefore they are natural
tools for competing in situations involving the chicken&egg problem that
characterizes two-sided markets. It is easier to attract a member facing
uncertainty on the other sides participation if this members payment is
contingent on the other sides participation.28
In the context of Bertrand competition with single-homing, platforms
would charge maximal transaction fees and subsidize participation. The com-
petitive e¤ect is then su¢ cient for the equilibrium to be e¢ cient with zero
prot.29
In the context of multi-homing, the conclusions are more complex. Typic-
ally multi-homing modies the analysis of divide&conquer strategies. Indeed
27In the context of the Hotelling model discussed by Armstrong (2006), there is a one-
to-one waterbed e¤ect so all prots from sellers are competed away on buyers.
28The same insight holds for Weyls concept of insulating tari¤, which may help to
provide credibility to this concept for competitive situations.
29With distortionary transaction fees and Bertrand competition, e¢ ciency would not be
achieved but there would still be zero prots (see Jullien (2007)).
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it is easier to convince an agent on one side to join since it does not need to
de-register from the other platform. But there is a weaker band-wagon e¤ect
and it becomes more di¢ cult to convince the other side to de-register from
the competitor. In this context transaction fees play two roles. First, they
raise the subsidy that can be paid up-front in order to attract an agent by
deferring the revenue to the transaction stage. Second, they are competitive
tools since agents may try to shop for the lowest transactions fees. As a con-
sequence two alternative strategies can be used by platforms to conquer the
market, depending on the prices of the competing platform. One strategy
aims at gaining exclusivity through low registration fees or subsidies and
generating revenue with high transaction fees. The other strategy consists in
inducing multi-homing but attracting transactions with low transaction fees.
To summarize, the fact that multi-homing agents try to concentrate their
activity on the low transaction fee platforms creates two levels of competition.
Intermediaries compete to attract registrations, and in a second stage they
compete to attract transactions by multi-homers. This competition tends to
reduce transaction fees. One should thus expect platforms to charge lower
transaction fees if there is a large extent of multi-homing. In the context of
Bertrand competition analyzed by Caillaud an Jullien (2003) the consequence
is that an e¢ cient equilibrium exists and involves zero prot if the intermedi-
ation technologies are identical.30 With di¤erent and imperfect technologies
however, prots will be positive unlike the single-homing case.31 Moreover,
this e¢ cient equilibrium may coexist with ine¢ cient competitive bottleneck
equilibria.
5 Design and other issues
While the two-sided market literature has to a large extent focused on pri-
cing issues with indirect network e¤ects, there are clearly other important
dimensions for BtoB platforms. The literature is still in its infant stage, but
some contributions address some other issues.
30By this it is meant that if one platform fails to generate a particular transaction, the
other will fail as well.
31With an imperfect intermediation technology, a third strategy always generates pos-
itive prots: it consists in focusing on agents who failed to perform a transaction on the
competing platform, by charging a high transaction fee, exploiting the last resort position.
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5.1 Sellers rivalry
Concerning the pricing strategies of a platform, the rst obvious issue is
that most of the literature abstracts from externalities between members
of the same side. In the context of BtoB marketplaces the assumption is
questionable as sellers of substitutable products will compete on the market,
which generates negative pecuniary externalities. An analysis of two-sided
markets with negative network e¤ects within sides and positive externalities
between sides is provided by Belleamme and Toulemonde (2009) where they
show that when they are neither too large or too small, negative externalit-
ies within sides impede the ability of divide&conquer strategies to overcome
the chicken&egg problem. This suggests that it may be more di¢ cult for
a potential entrant to nd his way to successful entry. Baye and Morgan
(2001) focus more explicitly on BtoB platforms and show that when sellers
are o¤ering substitutable goods and are the source of revenue of the platform,
the platform will restrict entry of sellers so as to reduce competition on the
platform and preserve a positive margin for sellers (see also White (2010)).32
Hagiu (2009) shows that, as a result of reduced sellerscompetition, an in-
crease in consumerspreference for variety raises the relative contribution of
sellers to a monopoly platform revenue.33 The paper by Nocke, Peitz and
Stahl (2007) discussed below also allows for sellers rivalry.
5.2 Tying34
Traditional business strategies need to be reconsidered in the context of two-
sided markets. For instance, tying has raised some attention, in part as a
consequence of the debates over the recent antitrust procedures surround-
ing Microsofts tying strategies. First, the traditional analysis of tying as an
exclusionary practice (Whinston (1990)) needs to be reconsidered as the un-
derlying strategic e¤ects are complex (Hagiu and Farhi (2008), Weyl (2008)).
Second, tying may have benecial e¤ects specic to two-sided markets.35 For
instance, Choi (2010) points to the fact that with multi-homing, tying may
raise the level of participation by inducing more agents to multi-home, raising
32See the chapter "Product and Price Comparison Sites" by J. Moraga and M. Wilden-
beest in this handbook.
33Results are more ambiguous for competing platforms, for reasons similar to Belle-
amme and Toulemonde (2009).
34See the chapter "Bundling Information Goods" by J.P. Choi in this handbook.
35See Rochet and Tirole (2004b) for a similar view on tying between two payment card
sytems.
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the global volume of transactions in the market.36 Amelio and Jullien (2007)
view tying as a substitute for monetary subsidies when the latter are not feas-
ible, thereby helping the platform to coordinate the two sides and to be more
e¢ cient in a competitive set-up, and analyze the strategic implications.37
5.3 Designing intermediation services
Tying is one instance of strategic decisions by platforms that relates to the
design of the platform architecture as well as pricing strategies. The devel-
opment of BtoB marketplaces has led to a burgeoning of innovation in design
and clearly design is an integral part of the business strategies adopted by
the platform. Despite a large literature on matching design, there is little
contribution on the interaction between design and pricing.38 Still this seems
to be an important avenue for future research as the incentives of a plat-
form to improve the e¢ ciency of the intermediation process will depend on
its ability to generate revenue from the improvement. Hence pricing mod-
els interact with technical choices in a non-trivial way. For instance Hagiu
and Jullien (2007) provides several rationales for an intermediary o¤ering
directed matching services to direct buyers toward sub-optimal matches, and
analyze the impact of pricing models on this phenomenon. Eliaz and Spiegler
(2010) and de Corniere (2010) identify a mechanism in a sequential search
model whereby a degradation of the quality of a pool of listed sellers leads to
higher prices charged by sellers, more clicks and more revenue for the plat-
form. For search engines, White (2009) analyzes the optimal mix of paying
and non-paying listed sellers, when there are pecuniary externalities between
sellers. All these contributions provide micro-foundations for design choices
by platforms that a¤ect the perceived quality of the intermediation service
by each side in di¤erent ways. At a more theoretical level, Bakos and Kata-
samas (2008) point to the e¤ect of vertical integration on the incentives of a
platform to bias the design in favour of one side or the other.
36An interesting example of e¢ cient bundling is the ability to solve the issue of buyers
moral hazard by bundling a well designed payment system with the matching service (see
for example the BtoC website PriceMinister).
37Bundling may of course serve more traditional price discrimination purposes. The
reader is refered to Jullien (2006) for an informal discussion of bundling in the context of
e-procurement.
38A noticeable exception is Damiano and Li (2008).
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5.4 Vertical integration and ownership
Vertical integration is a common feature of BtoB platforms and one that is
important for two reasons.39 First, vertical integration is one way to reach a
critical size on one side, thereby gaining enough credibility to convince other
agents to join the platform. Second, vertical integration leads to internaliz-
ation of the surplus of the integrated buyers or sellers. It thus a¤ects the
pricing strategy of the platform and may lead them to be more aggressive
in attracting new members.40 Moreover entry by integrated platforms may
be more di¢ cult to deter than entry by independent platforms, as shown
for instance by Sülzle (2009). Another issue relates to the distribution of
ownership which is discussed by Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2007), where it is
shown that for strong network e¤ects, an independent concentrated own-
ership dominates in terms of social welfare dispersed ownership as well as
vertical integration with a small club of sellers.
5.5 Sellersinvestment
While most contributions assumes the products are exogenous, some discuss
the link between the platforms strategy and that sellers quality choices.
Belleamme and Peitz (2010) analyze sellers pre-a¢ liation investment with
two competing platforms. They compare open access platforms with for-
prot pay platforms and conclude that investment incentives are higher in
the latter case whenever sellers investment raises consumers surplus to a
su¢ cient extent (the precise meaning of "su¢ cient" depends on the single-
homing/multihoming nature of participation on both sides). Hagiu (2009)
shows that charging transaction fees may help a platform fostering sellers
pre-a¢ liation investment incentives (the argument follows from Hagiu (2004)
discussed in section 3.2). Hagiu (2007) argues that a two-sided platform may
outperform traditional buy-and-resell intermediation when sellers must in-
vest to raise consumers utility after the a¢ liation/wholesale decisions are
made.
6 Conclusion
On-line intermediaries can be seen as platforms where trading partners meet
and interact. The literature on two-sided markets provides a useful perspect-
39This is usually referred as biased marketplaces, see Kaplan and Sawheny (2000). As
an example Covisint is jointly owned by car manufacturers Daimler, General Motors, Ford
and Renault-Nissan.
40See Yoo et al. (2007).
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ive on the business strategies by focusing on two-sided network externalities
and their implications for tari¤s and competition. Beyond the overall price
level, it is the entire price structure that matters and the literature helps un-
derstanding how the prices are a¤ected by indirect networks e¤ects. A key
lesson is that prices should and will involve some form of cross-subsidy. Typ-
ically, the platform should court more the low externality side than the other.
Moreover, unlike one-sided activities, competition exacerbates the tendency
to cross-subsidy. Multi-homing may improve e¢ ciency, but has the potential
adverse e¤ect of softening competition.
Much remains to be understood about competition, in particular due to
the lack of a tractable well articulated model of dynamic competition. In
particular the literature so far does not provide a clear view on barriers to
entry. While the analysis of divide&conquer strategies suggests that there
are opportunities for new entrants, these strategies may be excessively risky
and not sustainable. Moreover issues of reputation and coordination point
to the existence of barriers to entry akin to those encountered in network
competition.
As pointed out by Jullien (2000), the intensication of competition gen-
erated by indirect network e¤ect suggests that there are particularly strong
incentives for platforms to escape competition through di¤erentiation and
excessive market segmentation, although little is known about the determ-
inants and the nature of platforms product design. And among the various
topics for future researches mentioned in the text, the most exciting and
novel concerns the linkage between design and business models.
To conclude, while the literature has been concerned with antitrust im-
plications, it has delivered few concrete recommendations for policy inter-
vention. One of the challenge for the coming years will then be to develop
models helping policy makers to deal with mergers and other antitrust issues
in two-sided markets.
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